There is a critical need for fully integrated interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that go well beyond past attempts at mere civil-military cooperation or collaboration. This paper focuses on how the military can better integrate civilian personnel and capabilities when it has the lead in stability operations.
It also explores how to effectively transition to a civilian leading role in these missions.
The paper first provides context by reviewing select lessons from several US operations executed since the end of the Cold War. Next, it assesses recent initiatives and military doctrinal changes that are designed to address these issues. It then explores several new civil-military organizational innovations that address these issues, such as US Africa Command and Provincial Reconstruction Teams. It also highlights the increasing reliance contractors who can fill the gaps in military and government civilian capabilities in these areas. Finally, it concludes with several recommendations for the Department of Defense to improve civil-military integration during stabilization missions.
CHALLENGES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION DURING STABILITY OPERATIONS
One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win: economic development, institutionbuilding and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more-these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success. contractors, are almost intuitively expected to have more appropriate skills and expertise to address these stabilization and reconstruction efforts as compared to uniformed military personnel. However, due to the lack of personnel in the civilian agencies of the US Government, the military has been forced to not only support stabilization and reconstruction efforts, but more often than not, to lead them.
In addition to traditional security related tasks, the activities required of US forces today include repairing critical infrastructure, developing and strengthening indigenous institutions and governance, providing essential services, promoting justice, and fostering economic development. In an explicit recognition of this reality, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a directive policy guidance in 2005 that states, "while many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S.
civilian professionals…U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so." 2 Thus, military support to security, stability, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) became a core mission for the US military.
Historically, efforts to achieve an effective integration of interagency capabilities have been limited at best. Despite wide recognition of the importance of improving US Government civilian capacity for these requirements, only modest efforts have been made. The US military will continue to play the leading role in stabilization and reconstruction missions in hostile environments. Currently, there is a critical need for fully integrated interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that go well beyond past attempts at mere civil-military cooperation or collaboration.
This paper focuses on how the military can better integrate civilian personnel and capabilities when it has the lead in stability operations. It also explores how to effectively transition to a civilian leading role in these missions. The 12 In the Panama and Haiti cases, the United States also sought "regime change," planned for a quick restoration of stability, and hoped to rapidly transition control of the situation to a newly established friendly host government.
These goals all required significant interagency coordination and synchronization. Even so, neither the military nor the other civilian agencies of the US government ever fully embraced the lessons or established effective mechanisms to institutionalize them. Even at the height of the CPA's tenure, only 56 per cent of its authorized civilian positions were filled. 18 Of those who did go to Iraq, most civilians were only there for a few months and many had limited experience with sustainable development programs.
This constant change of civilian personnel led to a further lack of continuity and inability to provide the consistent support needed to help develop Iraqi institutions. As the military stepped in to fill the voids, taking on more and more of the responsibilities for reconstruction and long-term development, it became evident that most lacked the necessary expertise or experience to do it as effectively as would civilian professionals.
Third, this lack of US government civilian personnel available to operate in hostile environments also complicated and reduced effective interagency coordination. The goal of achieving "unity of effort" among the various personnel and agencies was hampered, particularly during the year of the CPA. There was a wide range of views regarding US objectives in Iraq. 19 Many civilians focused on implementing "policies that set out to change the politics, economy, and even the culture of Iraq," while the military initially "thought of its mission as almost the opposite," essentially just winning the conflict and then turning over responsibility for follow-on requirements to civilians. Based upon these and other historical experiences, Dr. Conrad Crane noted that, While there is universal agreement about who should ideally be rebuilding states, the harsh historical reality is that the world's greatest nationbuilding institution, when properly resourced and motivated, is the US military, especially the US Army. American military forces would like to quickly win wars and go home, but the United States has rarely accomplished long-term policy goals after any conflict without an extended American military presence to ensure proper results from the peace.
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There appears to be no end in sight for the demands of stability operations. Army
Chief of Staff, General George W. Casey, frequently notes that for the foreseeable future, the United States and its military forces will operate in an environment of "persistent conflict." 25 Complex and multidimensional conflicts will take place "among rather than around the population" and cannot be won by force alone. Rather, it will require the effective application of all instruments of national power in innovative and integrated systems.
Recent Developments
The US military has now embraced "stability operations" in recognition of the frequent and increasingly important role they play in them, while simultaneously Strategic and International Relations coined the term "Smart Power" to describe the development of such "an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power." 26 
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US military personnel must be prepared to execute all stabilization requirements when civilians are not able to do so. To ensure sufficient resources and training are applied to these areas, the Directive further states that "stability operations are a core U.S. military mission" that shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership personnel, facilities, and planning. 27 Reflecting on his division and corps command experiences in Iraq, LTG Peter W. Chiarelli effectively captured this requirement:
Another reality the uniformed forces must accept culturally is that, like it or not, until further notice the U.S. Government has decided that the military largely owns the job of nation-building....Today, the U.S. military is the only national organization able to conduct some of the most critical tasks associated with rebuilding war-torn or failed nations. … Unless and until there is a significant reorganization of U.S. Government interagency capabilities, the military is going to be the Nation's instrument of choice in nation-building. 28 At the same time, while military leaders are responsible for nation-building tasks, by default they also must constantly assess the impact on current and future operational capability as soldiers spend more time away from their primary warfighting skills. The effort must be rebalanced as necessary with the ultimate goal of civilians taking the lead. If such a shift to civilian responsibility does not occur, the risk of further overextending the military will increase as they continue these activities even though more traditional development organizations and systems would be more appropriate.
"By defaulting to reliance on the military," one report concludes, "the United States aggravates existing institutional imbalances. The distribution of responsibilities for specific tasks between military personnel and civilians is in large part directly dependent on the level of violence and hostilities in an area. One key challenge is to effectively identify the most appropriate transition points to adjust levels of effort. A report co-chaired by Brent Scowcroft and Sandy
Berger described how this balance might ideally shift over time as conditions change:
The armed forces will necessarily play a lead role in providing initial security. As security improves, civilian agencies and international financial institutions will move to the forefront. At all stages, close coordination between military and civilian agencies is essential to success, which may be judged by the development of an indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, and…healthy civil society. 33 Figure 2 represents this process, but it also highlights one of the key challenges of these transitions --who should have the lead responsibilities across the spectrum of SSTR. 34 It is important to note that the graph is not time dependent and is based upon events as violence ebbs. This could take months or years. Regardless of the length of time, however, a critical gap arises at the dashed line as the military role begins to decreases and civilian personnel are not capable of taking over the leading role for the situation. This is potentially the most challenging period across the spectrum.
Figure 2. Military and Civilian Transitions in Stability Operations
Of course, such transitions do not actually occur all at once with a final concluding ceremony. Rather, they are a "rolling process of little handoffs between different actors along several streams of activities. There are usually multiple transitions for any one stream of activity over time." 35 For the military, transitions are a routine part of all operations and many of their standard hand-off approaches can be applied to those between soldiers and civilians. However, all of them require detailed planning to ensure conceptual unity is maintained. Additionally, they must always consider the relationships established with local actors in order to sustain an "atmosphere of cooperation, collaboration, and enfranchisement" for them.
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Ongoing Organizational Innovations
Traditionally, the primary interagency coordination venue for the US government occurred at the strategic or national level through the National Security Council (NSC).
Today's NSC, however, is primarily a policy formulation body and does not actually oversee management of the interagency process or provide a planning or operational coordination system. "As a result, the departments are bereft of a team concept, and have little interdepartmental consensus on problems, causes, or the systems environment." 37  Civilian agencies must focus on becoming more operational, expeditionary, and capable of planning for and executing contingency responses.
 Military forces and civilian agencies must make use of joint strategies, plans, and operational approaches to ensure reinforcing effects at all levels.
 Military forces must become more capable of supporting … and performing non-kinetic missions when necessary.
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In recognition of such requirements, the US government has developed several new organizational innovations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that have met with varying degrees of success.
In December 2006, the Bush Administration issued National Security Presidential Another new organization that operates on the ground, but that can affect strategic and operational level issues is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).
They are a creative development in the search for an effective civil-military integration model to address the requirements of stability operations.
PRTs are useful innovations, but should be seen as works in progress. They extend America's and its allies' presence and connections while providing unique insights. They can be agile and catalytic, and at their best they address local opportunities in an integrated fashion. As with any new approach, PRTs have become the subject of numerous critiques. One recent study summed up several of these shortcomings as follows:
PRT effectiveness has sometimes been hampered by ambiguous mandates, the absence of interagency doctrine, the lack of metrics for success, inadequate baseline assessments and strategic planning, insufficient civilian agency personnel and resources, minimal predeployment training, and uneven coordination with other agencies. 46 Of particular concern is the continued lack of US civilian government capacity to sustain the required number of personnel. 2005 Defense Science Board captured this fact by describing the private sector as the "fifth force provider" and noting that "in future stability operations, the fraction of the 'force' from the private sector may be greater or lesser, but will inevitably be significant." 55 The use of contractors by the US government in stabilization and reconstruction efforts goes well beyond the more publicized roles of private security companies such as Blackwater, USA or large logistic companies such as KBR, Inc.
Civilian agencies, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), have long relied on contractors. For example, a 2007 USAID briefing on US capacity for current operations also notes that while USAID has only 1,095 Foreign Service Officers, it also routinely has over 624 US personal service contractors. Of these, it relies on over 495 of them to fill critical positions overseas. 56 Additionally, according to Ambassador John Herbst at S/CRS, even if the plans to develop greater civilian capacity in the US government are fully instituted, "there will still be a substantial need for contractors" in stabilization and reconstruction activities for the foreseeable future. 57 The use of contractors by civilian agencies to support humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and development has been rather uncontroversial. However, any contractor role in unstable environments can raise common issues regarding oversight, reliability, cost effectiveness, legal status, and clarification of inherently governmental functions. 58 Additionally, ongoing concerns both about the US government's ability to manage and oversee service contracts, as well as the role private security contractors may affect how the private sector is used in other areas. While it is important to resolve these issues, the concern here is how contractors can best support stability tasks.
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In many ways, contractors are ideally suited for these requirements and have been involved in such missions for years. One company heavily involved in supporting US stabilization missions points to several important contributions they routinely make in stability operations. 60 The first includes expertise with unique skill sets and methodologies, particularly for building the institutional capacity in the struggling government the US is supporting. The second is long-term continuity and staying power that are critical for enhancing personal relationships with local leaders. Lastly, the private sector provides a "bridge" for transitions. Figure 3 highlights the particular importance of this role. 61 In both Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors hired by the US government are working with local leaders to help build critical institutions and systems filling key gaps in expertise for the military. As civilian agencies begin to assume the lead in theses tasks, contractors are providing continuity. Even after civilian agencies take full responsibility, some of the same contractors will continue working as "consultants" to the host nation until it is fully capable of taking on the responsibilities. A useful structural model and framework for this proposal is the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). 63 The 64 The field teams for the new organization would be based upon the current PRT model, but would better be described as "civic engagement teams" to Contractors provide critical expertise that can fill gaps between civilians and the military for these operations, and they serve as a critical bridge for transitions to civilian control.
The DSB study's call for an organization to exploit the "fifth provider force" would go far to providing coherence to the contracting process. 65 The with them in the field. Ideally, the actual civilian personnel will be available for key events to maximize familiarization with one another and to ensure smoother integration.
Lastly, support for Provisional Reconstruction Teams should be institutionalized within DOD and "improvisation should be replaced with an agreed concept of operations." 67 This would require the establishment of consistent and formalized roles, missions, and authorities for the teams. A recent interagency workshop noted that that the PRT concept is becoming institutionalized in civilian agencies through the developing Interagency Management System, but they also recommend that PRTs have "an integrated chain for command, planning, and support at all levels." 68 They also note that PRTs need a framework for "top-down direction on roles and missions."
Military commanders involved in reconstruction and stabilization efforts must also understand and consider longer-term development priorities of civilian agencies. This will help ensure they set the conditions for the PRTs and future interagency efforts.
69
Conclusions
The US military has now embraced stability operations as a core mission.
Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to broad acknowledgement among military leaders that these tasks are essential to win the peace, as well as the war. As the Army counterinsurgency manual notes, today's operations occur "among the populace" and therefore, "political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of the conflict."
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It is clear that the US military will play the leading role in stability and reconstruction missions in hostile environments. Uniformed personnel will have significant responsibilities long after the security situation improves and civilian professionals take over these nation-building efforts. Lasting success can only come through a truly "whole of government" effort that leverages capabilities from all instruments of national power including the military, government civilians, and the private sector. However, the military must refine systems and organizations to more effectively integrate civilian organizations as they join the fight. 
